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This paper considers a model of an open economy in which the degree 
of income-tax progressivity influences the interaction among openness, 
central bank independence, and the inflation rate. Our model suggests that an 
increase in the progressivity of the tax system induces a smaller response in 
real output to a change in the price level. This implies that increased income-
tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation rate and that the effect of 
increased income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller when the central 
bank places a higher weight on inflation or when there is greater openness. 
Examination of cross-country inflation data provides empirical support for 
these key predictions.  
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1. Introduction  
 
A significant literature has developed since Romer’s (1993) 
seminal paper exploring the nature of the relationship between the 
extent of openness to international trade and inflation. Romer’s 
motivation for the negative dependence of inflation on openness 
observed in cross-country data hinged on the idea that greater 
openness might worsen the terms of the output-inflation trade-off, 
thereby reducing a monetary authority’s incentive to inflate. This 
rationale best applies to countries sizable enough to affect 
international relative prices, and Lane (1997) explored how greater 
openness can reduce the potential output gains from unexpected 
inflation in non-traded-goods sectors with imperfectly competitive 
goods markets and sticky prices. Nevertheless, Temple’s (2002) 
examination of the relationship between openness and sacrifice ratios 
across a range of nations cast doubt on Romer’s proposed explanation 
of the openness–inflation relationship. Daniels and VanHoose (2006) 
and Razin and Yuen (2002) offered alternative perspectives indicating 
that in fact the sacrifice ratio should respond positively to an increased 
degree of openness, yet inflation nevertheless should decline. Daniels 
et al. (2005) and Razin and Loungani (2005) have provided empirical 
support for a positive relationship between openness and the sacrifice 
ratio, while preserving the predicted inverse relationship between 
openness and inflation found in the data by Romer and others.  
 
Missing from this literature to date has been consideration of the 
role that a nation’s tax structure likely has on the equilibrium inflation 
rate. This is somewhat surprising for two reasons. First, some 
researchers have questioned whether the trade openness–inflation 
relationship either may be illusory (Terra, 1998; Ball, 2006) or may 
have shifted or even broken down since the early 1990s (Bleaney, 
1999). Second, the marginal tax rate is a key supply-side factor 
influencing the out-put-inflation relationship and hence the equilibrium 
inflation rate. The considerable cross-country variation in degrees of 
marginal tax rates suggests that the interplay between the effects of 
trade openness and income-tax progressivity – measured by the ratio 
of marginal to average tax rates – should be explored.  
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This paper considers an open-economy framework which 
accounts for the fact that in a more progressive tax system, the 
marginal tax rate is more responsive to a given change in real income. 
Consequently, an increase in real output induced by a rise in the price 
level raises the marginal tax rate by a larger amount, which reduces 
the actual rise in output generated by a given increase in the price 
level. This reduces the incentive to increase money growth in an effort 
to raise the price level with an aim to boost output. Thus, money 
growth and inflation are lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is 
more progressive.  
 
Our model also indicates that the degree of central bank 
independence also plays a role in influencing how the progressivity of 
the income-tax system and openness affect inflation. This is true 
because central bank independence has its own effects on the latter 
two variables, thereby conditioning the impacts of variations in 
income-tax progressivity and openness.  
 
To evaluate the predictions forthcoming from the theoretical 
model, we consider cross-country data on income-tax progressivity, 
openness, central bank independence, and inflation. Empirical analysis 
of cross-country inflation rates provides empirical support favoring the 
theoretical prediction of a negative relationship between inflation and 
the progressivity of the income-tax system. This analysis also supports 
the theory’s subsidiary implications that greater openness and 
increased central bank independence both reduce the effects of 
income-tax progressivity on inflation – and vice versa. Thus, a larger 
degree of income-tax progressivity may reduce the negative influence 
of greater openness on inflation.  
 
The next section presents our theoretical model and its 
predictions regarding how income-tax progressivity, openness, central 
bank independence affect the inflation rate. Section 3 assesses the 
empirical implications of our analysis and evaluates the evidence. 
Section 4 summarizes our conclusions.  
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2. A model of the interplay among openness, 
progressive taxation, and inflation  
 
The theoretical framework is based in part on the model 
developed in Daniels and VanHoose (2006). There are numerous 
atomistic firms, indexed i, distributed uniformly along a unit interval. A 
portion, Ω, of firms have workforces that contractually set nominal 
wages in advance of labor-market clearing. Spot labor markets 
determine nominal wages in the portion of firms, 1- Ω, that do not 
have such contracts. Duca and VanHoose (2001) have shown in a 
closed-economy version of this basic framework that if risk-neutral 
firms and risk-averse workers face common aggregate shocks and 
heterogeneously distributed firm-specific disturbances, Ω typically lies 
between zero and unity but declines as the variability of firm-specific 
disturbances increases relative to the volatility of aggregate shocks. To 
maintain tractability, we treat Ω as an exogenous parameter and 
thereby abstract from considerations of disturbances that influence the 
share of firms with nominal wage contracts.  
 
We also consider the competitive limit of the Daniels–VanHoose 
framework, in which we take into account income taxation. The output 
produced by a given firm i is  
 
yi = ali, 
(1)  
Where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at firm i. 
We abstract from productivity or other shocks that would not influence 
trend inflation in the standard Barro and Gordon (1983) discretionary-
policy framework. The domestic nation’s income-expenditure 
equilibrium condition (for a derivation of this Cobb–Douglas 
approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991; or 
Bryson et al., 1993) is given by  
 
𝑦 =  𝜂 (𝑝∗ + 𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 −  𝛽)𝑦 +  𝛽𝑦∗ 
(2)  
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where 𝑦 ≡  ∫ 𝑦𝑖
1
0
𝑑𝑖 is the log of aggregate domestic output; 𝑝 ≡
 ∫ 𝑝𝑖
1
0
𝑑𝑖 is the log of the aggregate domestic price level; the average 
propensity to import, β, is a fraction; η is the elasticity of desired 
spending with respect to the real exchange rate; p * is the log of the 
aggregate foreign price level; s is the log of the domestic currency 
price of foreign currency; and p* is the log of aggregate foreign 
output. Specifying analogous structural relationships for a foreign 
nation would yield a two-country framework in which y* and p* would 
be endogenous variables, but here we assume the output and prices 
abroad are exogenously determined. Henceforth, the foreign money 
stock, foreign price level, and foreign output are normalized at unity, 
so that p* and y* equal zero. Finally, domestic income is determined 
by the quantity equation  
 
y = m - p, 
(3)  
where m is the log of the money stock and where the log of velocity 
has been normalized at a value of zero.  
 
Using (1) in the profit function, PiYi - WiLi, yields the labor 
demand function for a firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it 
plays no role in our subsequent analysis): 
 
𝑙
𝑑
𝑖
=  
−(𝑤𝑖−𝑝)
1−𝑎
, 
(4)  
Where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.  
 
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and 
foreign-produced goods. Consequently, labor supply to firms depends 
on the after-tax real wage computed in terms of the overall price 
workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods:  
 
𝑙
𝑠
𝑖
=  𝜆[𝑤𝑖 − (1 −  𝛽)𝑝 −  𝛽𝑠 −  𝜏], 
 (5)  
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where λ > 0 and where τ is the marginal tax rate applied to workers’ 
wage income, with all revenues collected by the government used to 
fund the distribution of lump-sum transfers to agents. Although 
standard labor theory indicates that tax-rate effects on labor supply 
can be muted by conflicting substitution and income effects, work 
building on Hausman (1981) has generally concluded that the 
hypothesized negative effect holds true – though the empirical 
magnitude of the effect depends on the estimated functional form and 
appears to vary somewhat across countries.2  
 
For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-
information, market-clearing wage satisfies (4) and (5) simultaneously 
and equals  
 
?̂?𝑖 =  
[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]𝑝+𝜆(1−𝛼)𝛽(𝑠−𝑝)+𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏
[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]
. 
(6)  
Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid by firm 
i if it is among the share, 1-Ω , of firms without nominal wage 
contracts, depends positively on the marginal income-tax rate. 
Substitution of (6) into either (4) or (5) and the result into (1) yields 
output of a noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:  
 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑐 =  
−𝛼𝜆𝛽(𝑠−𝑝)−𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏
[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]
. 
 (7)  
Thus, output of a firm without wage contracts responds negatively to a 
real depreciation of the home currency, because this reduces the 
purchasing power of workers’ wages and thereby generates a ceteris 
paribus decline in labor supply and hence a decline in spot-market 
employment at noncontract firms. Because a higher marginal tax rate 
induces a decline in labor supply that requires paying a higher nominal 
wage, a noncontract firm’s output also depends negatively on the 
marginal tax rate.  
 
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, Ω, of firms with 
nominal wage contracts, the contract wage is equal to the expected 
value of the market clearing wage:   
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𝑤𝑖
𝑐 =  
[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]𝑝𝑒 + 𝜆(1 − 𝛼)𝛽(𝑠𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒) + 𝜆(1 − 𝛼)𝜏𝑒
[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]
  
 (8) 
Substituting (8) into (4) and the result into (1) yields output of a firm 
with wage contracts:  
 
𝑦𝑖
𝑐 =  
𝛼[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1](𝑝−𝑝𝑒)−𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝛽(𝑠𝑒−𝑝𝑒)−𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏𝑒
(1−𝛼)[𝜆[1−𝛼]+1]
. 
(9)  
Thus, output increases in response to price-level prediction errors, an 
anticipated real home currency appreciation, or an anticipated cut in 
the marginal tax rate.  
 
To explore the implications of the structure of a nation’s tax 
system for the relationship between openness, the price-
responsiveness of output, and inflation, we follow McCallum and 
Whitaker (1979), Benavie and Froyen (1986) and Waller and 
VanHoose (1989) by considering an approximation to the marginal tax 
rate function given by  
 
𝜏 =  𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑦, 
(10)  
where τ0 is a base level of the marginal tax rate and τ1 determines the 
degree of progressivity of the tax system. If τ1 = 0, the marginal tax 
rate is independent of income, implying a proportional tax system. For 
τ1 < 0, the tax system is regressive, and for τ1 > 0, the tax system is 
progressive.3  
 
Firms behave identically, so that 𝑦𝑖
𝑐 =  𝑦𝑐 for all 𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝛺], 
𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑐 =  𝑦𝑚𝑐for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝛺, 1]. It follows that 𝑦 =  𝛺𝑦𝑐 + (1 − 𝛺)𝑦𝑚𝑐. 
Together with the marginal tax rate function in (10), (7) and (9) then 
imply a semi-reduced-form solution for output that can be combined 
with (3) and (2) to determine the semi-reduced forms for the log of 
the price level and the nominal exchange rate in terms of expected 
values of the various macroeconomic variables. Substitution of these 
solutions back in the model then yields a semi-reduced-form 
expression for aggregate output:  
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol 31, No. 3 (September 2009): pg. 969-988. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
8 
 
𝑦 =  
𝛺𝛼[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1](𝑝 − 𝑝𝑒) − 𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝛼)[(1 − 𝛺)𝛽(𝑠 − 𝑝)] + 𝛺𝛽(𝑠𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒) + 𝛺𝜏1(𝑚
𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒) + 𝜏0
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1] + (1 − 𝛺)𝛼𝜆(1 − 𝛼)𝜏1
 
(10)  
This implies that the responsiveness of aggregate output to a change 
in the domestic price level is given by 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑝
=
𝛺𝛼[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]+(1−𝛺)𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝛽
(1−𝛼)[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]+(1−𝛺)𝛼𝜆(1−𝛼)𝜏1
 , 
which is directly related to the magnitude of β. Consequently, as in 
Daniels and VanHoose (2006), an increase in openness increases the 
sensitivity of output to a rise in the price level. In addition, this price-
sensitivity of output is inversely related to the τ1 parameter and hence 
to the degree of progressivity of the income-tax system. In a more 
progressive tax system, the marginal tax rate is more responsive to a 
given change in real income. An increase in real output induced by a 
given price-level increase thereby boosts the marginal tax rate by a 
larger amount under a more progressive income tax, which in turn 
tends to depress to a greater extent the actual output increase that is 
forthcoming from the given price-level increase. Hence, an increase in 
the extent of income-tax progressivity brings about a smaller response 
in real output to a change in the price level, ceteris paribus, in a nation 
with a more progressive tax system. Following Barro and Gordon 
(1983), we consider a Nash game involving the central bank and wage 
setters in which the central bank seeks to minimize the policy loss 
function,  
𝐿 = 𝐸[(𝑦 − ?̂?)2 + 𝑏𝑐𝑏𝜓
2], 
(12)  
where ?̂?is the nondistorted, full-information economy-wide output 
under market clearing, 𝑏𝑐𝑏 is the relative weight that the central bank 
places on the inflation component of its loss function, and ψ is the CPI 
inflation rate. Re-solving the model under full information—that is, 
with 𝑠𝑒 = 𝑠, 𝑝𝑒 = 𝑝, and 𝑚𝑒 = 𝑚 ex ante – and setting 𝜏0 = 𝜏1 = 0yields 
the nondistorted, full-information output level of zero. Consequently, 
?̂? = 0 in (12). Under the simplifying assumption that 𝑝−1 = 𝑠−1 = 0, the 
CPI inflation rate is 𝜓 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑝 + 𝛽𝑠 . Minimizing (12) with respect to 
m and solving for 𝜓 ultimately yields  
 
𝜓 = (
𝑏𝑐𝑏(𝜂 − 𝛽
2){(𝜆 + 1)(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛺[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]} − 𝛢−1𝜆𝛼2(1 − 𝛼)𝜂𝛺[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1]
𝑏𝑐𝑏[𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1][1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝛺)]
) 
× (
𝜆𝛼(1−𝛼)
𝜂(1−𝛼)[𝜆(1−𝛼)+1]+𝜆𝛼(1−𝛼)𝜂𝜏1+𝛽2
) 𝜏0, 
(13)  
where 𝛢 ≡ [𝜂(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛽2𝛺𝛼][𝜆(1 − 𝛼) + 1] + (1 + 𝛺)𝜆𝛼(𝜂𝜏1 + 𝛽
2). 
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An immediate implication of (13) is that 
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝜏1
< 0, so that an 
increase in the degree of progressivity of the tax system 
unambiguously reduces the equilibrium inflation rate under discretion. 
An increase in tax progressivity makes output less sensitive to changes 
in the price level, which in turn reduces the incentive to increase 
money growth in an effort to raise the price level in an attempt to 
boost output. As a consequence, money growth and CPI inflation are 
lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is more progressive.  
 
Further evaluation of the expression for 
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝜏1
 indicates that either 
an increase in 𝑏𝑐𝑏  or in a rise in β causes the absolute value of this 
derivative to decrease. An increase in the relative weight placed on 
inflation, 𝑏𝑐𝑏, in the central bank’s loss function reduces inflation, so 
the marginal effect on inflation of greater tax progressivity is lower at 
larger values of 𝑏𝑐𝑏. As in Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et 
al. (2005), the direct effect of greater openness (b) is to increase the 
sensitivity of output with respect to the price level, so an increase in β 
tends to counter the effect of greater tax progressivity on inflation, 
thereby reducing the absolute value of 
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝜏1
.  
 
In general, both the direct effect of greater openness and the 
effects of changes in the sensitivity of inflation with respect to 
openness resulting from variations in the degree of tax progressivity or 
the central bank’s loss weight on inflation depend on relative 
magnitudes of parameter values. Evaluation of the direct effect of an 
increase in the degree of openness, β, on inflation yields sufficient, but 
unnecessary, conditions for greater openness to reduce inflation (that 
is, 
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝛽
< 0): (1) most of the weight in the loss function is on the 
inflation objective (a sufficiently large value of 𝑏𝑐𝑏 ) or (2) the marginal 
propensity to import is sufficiently larger than the sensitivity of 
expenditures with respect to the real exchange rate (𝛽2 > 𝜂 ). If 
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝛽
< 0, 
then it is also true that an increase in either 𝜏1 or in 𝑏𝑐𝑏 generate 
reductions in the absolute magnitude of this derivative; that is, in this 
case, either a greater degree of progressivity of the tax system or an 
increased policy weight on inflation tend to reduce the effect of 
increased openness on inflation.  
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The reason for the potential ambiguity in the inflation effects of 
openness is that greater openness exerts two conflicting effects. On 
one hand, as in Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et al. 
(2006), because labor supply depends on the real wage computed in 
terms of the overall price that workers pay for a basket of both 
domestic and foreign goods, a real depreciation of the home currency 
reduces the purchasing power of market-clearing wages, which 
generates a ceteris paribus fall in labor supply that, in turn, causes a 
decline in spot-market employment. Thus, the output of firms without 
wage contracts responds negatively to a real depreciation of the home 
currency, and this effect is enhanced in a more open economy, 
ultimately implying that a greater degree of openness causes output to 
be more responsive to inflation. This, in turn, tends to increase the 
incentive for the central bank to push up money growth and generate 
higher equilibrium inflation.  
 
On the other hand, increased openness reduces the extent to 
which an unanticipated real depreciation can potentially generate an 
increase in output. To see this, note that (2) implies, under the 
maintained assumption 𝑝∗ = 0, that, ex ante, aggregate expenditures 
are given by 𝑦 = 𝛽−1𝜂(𝑠 − 𝑝). An increase in the value of the marginal 
propensity to import, β, relative to the sensitivity of expenditures with 
respect to the real exchange rate, η, thereby reduces the extent to 
which changes in the real exchange rate brought about by variations in 
the money stock can affect aggregate demand, ex ante. This, in turn, 
reduces the incentive for a discretionary central bank to increase 
money growth.  
 
On net, therefore, the ex post effect of greater openness on 
equilibrium inflation is ambiguous in the present model, although as 
noted above, it is more likely to be negative if 𝛽2 > 𝜂. As noted above, 
from an ex ante perspective, a sufficiently higher initial value of the 
marginal propensity to import relative to an initial value of the 
expenditure responsiveness to the real exchange rate reduces the 
extent to which a monetary expansion can boost output via a 
discretionary increase in money growth. At the same time, because 
CPI inflation is 𝜓 = 𝑝 + 𝛽(𝑠 − 𝑝), a rise in the magnitude of balso has the 
effect of enlarging the extent to which the real exchange rate plays a 
role in determining equilibrium CPI inflation, which increases the ex 
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ante incentive for the central bank to reduce money growth. This 
explains why if β is sufficiently large relative to g, increased openness 
is more likely to reduce equilibrium inflation.  
 
3. Empirical implications and evidence  
 
Following are the empirical implications of the forgoing 
discussion:  
 
i. Increased income-tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium 
inflation rate.  
ii. The effect of increased income-tax progressivity on inflation is 
smaller when the central bank places a higher weight on 
inflation or when there is greater openness.  
iii. The effect of greater openness on inflation is generally 
empirically ambiguous, but if this effect is negative, then it is 
absolutely smaller due to increased income-tax progressivity or 
when the central bank places a higher weight on inflation.  
 
To measure the degree of income-tax progressivity (Tax) for 
individual nations, we use the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the 
average tax rate.4 The marginal tax rate is measured by the change in 
single employees’ social security contribution and personal income-tax 
payments in response to a change in gross wage earnings. The 
average tax rate is the level of social security and tax payments 
divided by the level of gross wage earnings. Both the marginal tax rate 
and the average tax rate are from Source OECD.5  
 
Our measure of the degree of central bank independence (CBI), 
is taken from Franzese (2002), which is a weighted average of legal 
independence, a characterization of independence based on answers to 
a survey completed by individuals at central banks (Cukierman, 1992), 
economic independence, political independence (Grilli et al., 1991), 
and Bade and Parkin’s (1982) index of central bank independence. 
This measure of CBI is a constant value across time for each country. 
The inflation rate is based on the GDP deflator, and openness is 
measured as the ratio of imports to GDP, both derived from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics 
on the sample data.6  
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Table 2 reports regression results for an annual sample of 17 
countries covering the period 1979-1999.7 Because of the time-series 
nature of this data set, all pooled/panel regressions are estimated 
using OLS with robust standard errors.8 Column (1) of the table 
provides results for the base specification that controls only for central 
bank independence and openness. The coefficients for both variables 
are negative and statistically significant.  
 
Column (2) of Table 2 reports a re-specification in which the tax 
progressivity measure is added. The estimated coefficient for the 
Openness variable is not statistically significant in this specification. 
The tax progressivity (Tax) coefficient, however, is negative and 
statistically significant, consistent with the theoretical model’s key 
implication that increased income-tax progressivity reduces the 
equilibrium inflation rate.  
 
The regression specification in column (3) of Table 2 adds 
interactions of tax progressivity and central bank independence 
(Tax*CBI) and for tax progressivity and openness (Tax*Openness). 
The estimated negative Openness coefficient is once again statistically 
significant in this broadened specification. The interaction term 
between tax progressivity and central bank independence is also 
statistically significant and positive, consistent with the theoretical 
model’s prediction that the (negative) effect of greater income-tax 
progressivity on inflation is smaller with greater central bank 
independence (assumed consistent with a higher central bank loss 
weight on inflation). Consistent with the theoretical framework’s 
implication that the (negative) effect of greater income-tax 
progressivity on inflation is smaller with greater openness, the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term between tax progressivity 
and openness is positive (indicating a absolute smaller effect of tax 
progressivity), but this coefficient is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels (with a p-value of 15%).  
 
Column (4) in Table 2 considers the impact that outliers might 
have on the results. To test for outliers, we use the dfits test, Cooksd 
test, and the Welsch distance test on the regression model in column 
(3). The results for all three tests imply outliers in 1980 for Italy, New 
Zealand, and the United States. These three observations are deleted 
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from the specification in column (3) to generate the results in column 
(4). Controlling for these outliers has no practical impact on the results 
described above.  
 
According to hypothesis (iii) implied by theoretical framework, if 
openness is statistically significant and negative, then its effect 
becomes absolutely smaller as the degree of tax progressivity 
increases. Consistent with this hypothesis, the estimated coefficient on 
Tax*Openness is consistently positive, but it is never significant at a 
level of 10% or less. To further explore the third hypothesis, column 
(5) adds an interaction term between central bank independence and 
openness to the specification in column (4). The only resulting changes 
are a positive but statistically insignificant effect of openness on 
inflation and an improvement in the p-value of the Tax*CBI interaction 
variable. In addition, the estimated effect of the openness-CBI 
interaction term is negative and significant. Hence, there is support for 
the theoretical prediction that the impact of openness on inflation is 
empirically ambiguous once the degrees of income-tax progressivity 
and central bank independence are taken into account.  
 
We also consider some recent results regarding the relationship 
between openness and inflation. According to Levin and Piger (2002) 
and Ihrig and Marquez (2003), time-series inflation data exhibit a 
break around the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bleaney (1999) further 
notes that around the time of this same break, the economic and 
statistical significance of the openness-inflation relationship began to 
diminish among developing nations. Including a dummy variable with 
a value of zero up until 1989 and a value of unity for the remainder of 
the sample period had little impact on our results. The p-value for 
Tax*CBI increased slightly but is still significant at the 5% level, and 
the p-value for Tax*Openness decreased to the 5–10% significance 
range (with a p-value of 5.5%).9  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This paper has developed an open-economy framework 
indicating that the structure of the tax system should worsen the 
terms of the output-inflation trade-off and reduce the equilibrium 
inflation rate. Our theoretical analysis also suggests that increased 
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openness and greater central bank independence should contribute to 
lower inflation. Yet it also indicates that increases in each of the three 
variables should decrease the extent to which any of the other two 
variables tends to decrease inflation. Study of the inflation rates of 
seventeen nations provides support for our predictions regarding direct 
and interactive effects of income-tax progressivity, openness, and 
central bank independence on inflation. Our empirical analysis of 
cross-country data results support both predictions. Increases in 
income-tax progressivity, openness, and central bank independence 
each contribute individually to lower inflation. When simultaneous 
effects of increases in all three variables are considered, however, the 
inflation-reducing impacts of a higher degree of income-tax 
progressivity and greater central bank independence appear to leave a 
smaller role for an inflation-reducing effect of increased openness.  
 
The role of taxation as a factor influencing the interactions 
among openness, central bank independence, and inflation rates has 
not received attention in the literature. The theoretical and empirical 
conclusions of this paper indicate that more consideration should be 
given to the role of fiscal variables as factors conditioning equilibrium 
inflation rates in open economies.  
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Notes  
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mail addresses: Joseph.Daniels@marquette.edu (J.P. Daniels), 
David_VanHoose@baylor.edu (D.D. VanHoose).  
 
1. Tel.: +1 254 710 6206; fax: +1 254 710 6142.  
2. Variation among estimated tax effects on labor supply across countries is 
revealed by comparing Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990), 
Bourguignon and Magnac (1990), Colombino and del Boca (1990) 
Triest (1990) and Van Soest et al. (1990).  
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3. Note that if the level of income-tax revenues is Ζ = 𝑧0𝑌
𝑧1 where 𝑧0 > 0 and Y 
is the level of income. The marginal tax rate is 𝜏 =
𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝑌
= 𝑧1𝑧0𝑌
𝑧1−1, which 
implies that the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate 
(𝑍𝑌−1) is equal to 𝑧1. In addition, the effect of a rise in income on the 
tax rate is 
𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝑌
= 𝑧1𝑧0(𝑧1 − 1)𝑌
𝑧1−2, so that 
𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌
 is monotonically related to 𝑧1. 
The tax system is progressive for 𝑧1 > 1, so that 
𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌
> 0, which in the 
linear approximation for τ in (10) implies 𝜏1 > 0 for a progressive tax 
system, where 𝜏1 is an approximation to 
𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌
. Conversely, the tax system 
is regressive for 𝑧1 < 1, so that 
𝜕𝜏
𝜕𝑌
< 0, implying 𝜏1 < 0 in (10).  
4. As discussed in footnote 1, the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average 
tax rate is monotonically related to the income-tax progressivity 
parameter 𝜏1 in the theoretical model and hence is the best available 
empirical proxy for this parameter.  
5. During the 1979-1993 interval, the OECD reports tax rates only for odd 
years. For this period, missing observations on the rates were imputed 
using the average of the two adjacent rates. All of the data used in 
this paper and all regression results are available upon request.  
6. Although we have only 21 years of data, we considered the unit root 
properties of the data. Based on the Levin, Lin and Chu t-statistic for 
panel data, we were able to reject a common unit root process for the 
four main variables.  
7. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. We limit 
consideration to pre-2000 data in light of formal formation of the 
European Monetary Union beginning in 1999.  
 
8. Because CBI is a constant value across time for each country, we are 
unable to estimate a fixed-effects model.  
9. In addition, we explored the robustness of our results by including 
(separately) year dummies, a time trend, and also specified that the 
disturbances are (i) panel-heteroskedastic and contemporaneously 
correlated, (ii) panel-heteroskedastic but not correlated, and (iii) 
independent across panels. The only impact on the results described 
above is that the year dummies, time trend, and assumption (i) on the 
disturbances each improved the p-value of the Tax-Openness variable 
such that is became significant at conventional levels. Overall, the 
effect of openness on inflation shows the greatest sensitivity to model 
specification and controls for model breaks and outliers.  
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